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IN THE SUPREME COURT 




JOHN A. HENDRICKS, as Judge of 
the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District in and for the 




Brief of Respondent 
The facts before this Honorable Court are not in 
dispute and have been fairly and accurately set forth 
in Plaintiff's Brief; however, it is the position of the 
respondent that the Justice of the Peace had jurisdiction 
of the cause and that the petitioner has a, plain, speedy, 
and adequate remedy at Jaw. Wherefore, the Peremp-
tory Writ of Prohibition issued by this Honorable Court 
should be set aside and the petition or application of the 
plain tiff dismissed. 
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ASSERTION NO. 1 
THE JUSTICE'S COURT HAD JURISDICTION. 
In his brief in support of application, plaintiff 
makes one statement of error, as follows: 
'' The District Judge, defendant herein, erred 
in denying plaintiff's motion to quash and to dis-
miss the complaint.'' 
The complaint, which is incorporated by reference as 
exhibit "A" to plaintiff's application for Writ of Pro-
hibition before this Honorable Court is : ''In the Justices' 
Court of The Precinct of Burch Creek, County of Weber, 
State of Utah.'' It charges the plaintiff, Leroy Newbill, 
with the commission of a misdemeanor in the aforesaid 
county and state, in that on or about the 24th day of 
July 1948, he unlawfully kept intoxicating liquor for the 
purpose of sale, contrary to the provisions of 46-0-156, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943. There is, therefore, no dis-
pute but that the misdemeanor was allegedly committed 
within the county of Weber. Said county embraces 
Burch Creek Precinct. 
Section 20-5-4, Utah Code Annotated 1943, reads in 
part as follows : 
"Justices' courts have jurisdiction of the fol-
lowing public offenses committed within the 
respective counties in whirh such courts are esta-
blished: 
( 3) Breaches of the peace, committing a will-
full injury to property, and all misdemeanors 
punishable by a fine less than $300 or by imprison-
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ment in the county jail or municipal prison not 
exceeding six months, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment.'' 
The Code of Criminal Procedure, through section 
105-57-1, directs : 
''In criminal cases the jurisdiction of justices 
of the peace extends to the limits of their respec-
tiYe counties.'' 
There is no provision in the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure requiirng that the place of trial be established in 
the precinct from which the justice is elected or appoint-
ed. There is provision by section 105-57-12 that the de-
fendant, by affidavit stating that he has reason to be-
lieve he cannot have a fair and impartial trial before the 
justice about to try the same, may have the action trans-
ferred to a justice of the county agreed upon by the 
parties. 
This court in State vs. Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 
Pac. (2) 1034, at page 1042 of the Pacific, has held tha.t 
the question of venue may be waived. 
A consideration of the remarks of this honorable 
court in Dillard vs. District Court of Salt Lake County, 
69 Utah 10, 251 Pac. 1070, leads to the conclusion that sub-
paragraph 3 of section 20-5-4, Utah Code Annotated 
1943 (supra) was adopted to avoid confusion concerning 
the jurisdiction of justices' courts. The case discloses : 
''In the year 1925, the Legislature, by chap-
ter 62, Laws of Utah 1925, passed an act entitled 
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Utah 1917, relating to the criminal jurisdiction of 
justice's court, where in and whereby the juris-
diction of justices' courts over public offenses 
was limited to those committed within their re-
spective precincts or citie~ in which such courts 
are established.'' 
This court stated at page 1072 of the Pacific: 
"Other objections to the statute in question 
are that it produces confusion and derangement 
in criminal practice and procedure in justices' 
courts, and is inconsistent with other statutory 
provisions. There can be no doubt of this conse-
quence. The system of procedure in such courts as 
established by law is in many respects adjusted 
to and dependent upon, the existence of a terri-
torial jurisdiction coextensive with the county. It 
is suggested that the restricted jurisdiction will in 
effect render nugatory the statute providing for 
the change in the place of trial on the ground of 
prejudice, because there will be no justice out of 
the precinct with jurisdiction to whom the action 
can be transferred; and that, in a case where the 
precinct justice is himself accused, or is disabled 
by sickness, or is disqualified by interest or rela-
tionship to the accused person, of occurring in one 
of the numerous counties having no city courts, 
there would be no other court with jurisdiction 
before whom the action could be commenced or 
treid. Other similar objections along this line are 
made. It is apparent that the statute was passed 
without consideration of these consequences. But 
these are not judicial questions, and we may not 
upon such grounds declare the act invalid. The 
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The Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as officially 
adopted and published, amended jurisdictional provi-
sions of section 20-5-4 and reestablished jurisdiction of 
the Justices' courts over offenses committed within the 
respective counties. On page 379 of the revision the fol-
lowing note appears: 
''The text of this section is a restoration of 
the law as it existed prior to the amendment by 
La,Ys, 1925, Chap. 62, which limited the jurisdic-
tion of justices of the peace in criminal cases to 
offenses committed within their respectiv pre-
cincts or cities, thus rendering conviction f.or a 
misdemeanor committeed in a precinct other than 
that of the place of trial a nullity. Dillard v. Dis-
trict Court, 251 P. 1070, 69 U. 10." 
There can be no doubt that the complaint was 
properly issued and the justice's court of the precinct of 
Burch Creek had jurisdiction over the subject matter; 
and that upon the arrest of the accused, jurisdiction 
existed over the person of I.Jeroy Newbill, the appellant 
or petitioner herein. Any irregularity occurring there-
after may have been raised upon appeal as provided by 
law, or by application to the District Court upon col-
lateral attack as provided and authorized under the pro-
visions of Article 8, Section 7 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah, which provides as follows: 
''The District Court shall have original juris-
diction in all matters civil and crimnal, not ex-
cepted in this Constitution, and not :f>rohibited 
by law; appellate jurisdiction from all inferior 
courts and tribunals, and a supervisory control of 
the same. The district Courts or any judge there-
. of, shall have power to issue writs of habeas: 
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corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, cer-
tiorari, prohibition and other writs necessary to 
carry into effect their orders, judgments and de-
crees, and to give them a general control over in-
ferior courts and tribunals within their respective 
jurisdictions.'' 
There are authorities which hold that a justice of 
the peace is a precinct officer and may not carry his 
court like a personal chattel outside of the district from 
which he was appointed. See Cox vs. Perkins, 299 Ky. 
470, 185 S.W. (2) 954, wherein the Kentucky court so 
held. However, it is to be_ noted that this case concerns 
an action brought directly against the justice of the 
peace and does not concern appellate action in direct 
attack upon his irregular exercise of jurisdiction. The 
Kentucky court held that the justice had no power to act 
beyond his territorial precinct, township or jurisdiction. 
The same result was reached in Ex parte Robinson, 56 
Oklahoma Criminal 404, 41 Pac. (2) 127; and Harring-
ton vs. State, 66 Oklahoma Criminal 310, 91 Pac. ( 2) 787. 
The Robinson case, supra, is reported as a habeas corpus 
proceeding wherein the petitioner claimed that he was 
unlawfully convicted of murder because of a denial of a 
preliminary hearing, in that the justice of the peace who 
conducted the preliminary hearing acted in the incorpor-
ated town of Konavva, Oklahoma, whereby he was elect-
ed and appointed a justice of the peace of Konawa town-
ship district which was beyond the limits of the town. 
The Harrington case would also appear to be quite dir-
ectly in point and involves a violation of liquor control 
lR\YS of the state of Oklahoma. Yet, it is to be noted that 
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in the Harrington case (upon appeal and application for 
dismissal) the complaint itself was issued by a justice 
of the peace who, at the time of issuing the complaint, 
was not within his territorial limits as such. 
Other cases hereinafter eited hold that 1n the ab-
sence of express statutory limits, where jurisdiction runs 
within the county of commission, it is only required that 
trial be held somewhere "'\\Tithin the county. See Antilla 
vs. Justice's Court of Big River Township, 209 Cal. 621, 
290 Pac. 43. See also ex parte Cohen, 107 Cal. App. 288, 
290 Pac, 512; State vs. Bunke, 113 Ore. 523, 233 Pac. 538; 
and State vs. Maughn, 35 Utah 426, 100 Pac. 934. Under 
provisions of legislative authorization and the authorities 
of this honorable court, the Justice of the Peace of Burch 
Creek Precinct had jurisdiction over the offense and al-
though the arraignment of the accused was conducted 
beyond his precinct and the sentence issued, jurisdiction 
was not to be nullified. In the event this court should 
decide that a justice of the peace cannot conduct trial 
any place within the county but is limited to the pre-
cinct of his appointment, nevertheless we submit that an 
abuse of process or irregularity in proceedings would not 
thereby deprive the Court of jurisdiction but would only 
be grounds for appeal, or in the event that an appeal 
does not afford a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, 
give rise to entitlement to an extraordinary writ applied 
for and issued directly to the justice in question. 
Plaintiff, by his application for Writ of Prohibition 
before this honorable court, would elect that the district 
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court, on appeal, erred in not disnvissing arnd quashing 
the complaint. It is the position of the respondent herein 
that the District Court, on appeal, properly denied such 
a motion. If the motion were granted there would be no 
complaint before the justice's court and no further pro-
ceedings to be heard in the district court. The-re is no 
assignment before this honorable court to the effect that 
the complaint was not properly issued by the Justice 
of the Peace of Burch Creek Precinct. The only error 
assigned is that he held court outside of his territorial 
limits. 
ASSERTION NO. 2 
THE DISTRICT COURT, DEFENDANT HERE-
IN, IS NOT IN E:aROR. 
,In his brief, counsel for the applicant, Leroy Newbill, 
states that an appeal from the action of the Justice's 
Court was filed with the District Court in and for the 
County of Weber. The provisions of section 105-57-38, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, read as follows: 
''Any defendant in a criminal action tried be-
fore a justice of the peace may appeal from the 
final judgment therein to the district court of the 
county where~ the court of such justice is held at 
any time within 30 days from the entry of the 
judgment.'' 
On the final page of his brief, counsel submits that the 
plaintiff was entitled. to have the complaint dismissed on 
motion, under the provisions of section 105-57-44, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943, '\\7hich- reads in part : 
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'·The complaint on motion of the defendant 
may be dismissed upon the following grounds : 
(1) That the justice did not havH jurisdic-
tion of the offense.'' 
Again we respectfully assert that there is no doubt 
of the jurisdiction of the J ustiee of Burch Creek or any 
other justice of the County of Weber, over the offense 
allegedly committed in said county. No application was 
made to the defendant, District Court, the respondent 
herein, for collateral proceedings against the judgment 
entered by the justice, rather plaintiff follows statutory 
procedure by direct appeal. He does not, in his appeal, 
request that the judgment of the justice be set aside but 
rather, claims a lack of jurisdiction. The District Court 
correctly ruled that the motion to dismiss be denied and 
that the defendant be required to appear upon a future 
day certain and plead to the charge. in anticipation of 
trial de novo. As indicated by Chief Justice Pratt of this 
honorable court, in his reasoning concerning the merits of 
petition for prohibition in the case of Robinson vs. City 
of Ogden, ______ Utah ______ , 185 Pac. (2) 256 at page. 26-3, 
had the defendant judge of the District Court granted 
the motions of the plaintiff there would riot only be a 
dismissal of the appeal but also a dismissal of the action 
''leaving nothing against petitioner in either court.'' The 
District Judge refuses to dismiss since the matter is prop-
erly before him on appeal and orders a trial de novo; 
then the plaintiff, Leroy Newbill, decides that his appeal 
will leave him in the same position perhaps as we was 
before the Justice Court; it is then he appears before this 
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honorable court, claiming that he is entitled to a Writ of 
Prohibition enjoining the District Judge from proceed-
ing and taking the· action contemplated by appeal. The 
position of the plaintiff is most waivering. 
ASSERTION NO. 3 
THE DISTRICT COURT ACQUIRED ORIGINAL 
JURISDICTION. 
Plaintiff invoked jurisdiction of the District Court 
, and the action of the court ma.y not now be- set aside by 
Writ of Prohibition upon the petition of the plaintiff. 
The question of original jurisdicton of .the District Court 
over misdemeanors triable before a justice of the peace 
was reached in State vs. Ferguson, 83 Utah 357, 28 Pa.c. 
(2) 175 and in the case of State vs. Telford, 95 Utah 228, 
72 Pac. (2) 626. Mr. Justice Wolfe, speaking for this 
honorable court, stated: 
"If the district court does proceed where it is 
shown that the matter was improperly transfer-
red, certainly the party requesting that it should 
so proceed cannot question what he consented to 
and requested. He is barred from asserting that 
the jurisdiction "ras not invoked, not because the 
court properly assumed it, but because estoppel 
holds up its hand and says, 'You shall not assert 
that its jurisdiction is improperly invoked.' If 
he cannot assert such lack of proper procedure, 
it is as to him as if it had been proper. There is a 
vast difference betV\7een something being correct 
and proper, and a situation where it is not but the 
facts are such that the court pulls down the cur-
tain on the contemplated assertion that it was not 
proper because of the principle of estoppal.-" 
10 
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And again ~fr. Justice Wolfe in the same case states: 
''Therefore, it must be assumed as far as the 
defendant is concerned that it did come up from 
an appeal, which 'vas the only other way it could 
properly come up. Thus, the jurisdiction of the 
district court is final unless a constitutional ques-
tion is involved. 
''In such case the appeal of this court should 
be dismissed rather than the judgment affirmed. 
Affirmance takes in the inference that an appeal 
to this court lies. Dismissal of the appeal infers a 
holding that no appeal alies and assigned errors 
cannot be reviewed. We take cognizance of the 
record in so far as to determine that the. case so 
stipulated into the district court was wrong, in-
voke the principle of estoppel against the appel-
lant, which results in a situation of the defendant 
having had a final hearing in the district court. 
The record revealing this, we should on our own 
motion dismiss on the ground that defendant has 
no right of appeal to this court. We cannot con-
sider assigned error and thus, by inference, hold 
that there is a right of appeal.'' 
In the case of State vs. Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 
Pac. (2) 1034, 1\Ir. Justice Larson distinguishes, in an· 
able treatise, between original and derivative jurisdic-
tion and quotes from the case In re B-urnette, 73 Kan. 
609, 85 Pac. 575, as follows: 
''The jurisdiction to consider and decide 
causes de novo is in its essence original. The 
manner in which a cast reaches the higher court is 
not the test. Jurisdiction being the power to hear 
and determine, the nature of the functions to be 
exercised controls whether they are brought into 
activity by primary process or by removal from 
11 
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an inferior tribunal. Upon a trial de novo the 
power of an appellate court in dealing with the 
pleadings and the evidence in the application of 
the law and in the rendition of judgment accord-
ing to the right of the case, all independent of the 
action of the lower court, is no different from 
what it would be if the case were begun there ori-
ginally, and hence is not 'appellate,' within the 
meaning of laws creating jurisdiction. Lacy v. 
williams, 27 Mo. 280; County of St. Louis v. 
Sparks, 11 Mo. (201) 203." 
He further states in the Johnson case at page 1042 
of the Pacific : 
''In cases in personam, the· question of venue 
may be waived. It is a right personal to the de-
fendant to have his cause tried in the court of 
proper venue, but if he willingly submits the 
matter to a court having jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter of the action he is bound by the ver-
dict or the judgment. Objections to venue in cases 
in personam must be raised or will be held to have 
been waived. ''The right to apply for a change of 
venue is waived by failure to apply therefor at 
the time and in the manner prescribed by law.'' 
67 C. J. 219; 27 R.C.L·. 819. 'It may be waived by 
certain acts of perticipation in_ the proceedings, 
or by filing a demurrer." 67 C. J. 202. 'To be 
effective an objection to the venue must be season-
ably made or it will be waived.' It 'must be made 
at or before filing a demurrer, or answering to the 
merits.' 67 C.J. 89; 27 R.C.L. 784. It has been 
held that the objection may be made at the trial 
but not after the introduction of evidence, and it 
is too late after verdict or judgment. Howland v. 
Sheriff of Queens County, 7 N.Y. Super. Ct. 219; 
Draper v. Kirkland, 1 Head, Tenn., 260; Howe v. 
Hatley, 186 Ark. 366, 54 S.W. 2d 64; Newcomer v. 
12 
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Sheppard, 31 Okl. 335, 152 P. 66; Johnston v. 
Wadsworth, 24 Or. 494, 34 P. 13; State v. Lehman, 
18:2 ~[o. 424, 81 S. "\V. 1118, 66 L.R.A. 490, 103 
... -\m. St. Rep. 670. ', 
The concurring opinions of ~Jr. Justice Wolfe and Jus-
tice Pratt in the same case substantiate the position 
of the respondent in every particular and support the 
action of the District Judge, respondent herein. 
It is difficult for counsel for the respondent to see 
how and in what manner the plaintiff has been prejudic-
ed by the action of the District Judge, since in a trial 
de novo, it is possible that he may have been 
acquitted and released. How and in what manner 
may it now be established that he had no plain, 
speedy and adequate remedy at law~ To grant the writ 
as requested by the plaintiff' would absolve him from 
responsibility before the law since he would have this 
court order the District Judge to dismiss the complaint. 
Section 105-57-43, Utah Code Annotated 1943 provides 
that an appeal, duly perfected from the justice's court, 
transfers the action to the District Court for trial anew. 
The authority of the justice to take further steps in the 
matter is to be terminated, yet the record shows that 
after filing his appeal, plaintiff filed his motion to quash 
and dismiss. 
See 31 Am. Juris. 728, Justices of the Peace, para. 37. 
13 
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CONCLUSION 
In summarization, cousel for respondent submit that 
the Justice of the Peace of Burch Creeks had jurisdiction 
of the offense charged; that having acquired jurisdic-
tion lawfully and regularly through a complaint regu-
larly issued, the Justice's Court would not lose jurisdic-
tion or entitle the accused to a dismissal because of the 
fact he was arraigned and sentenced without the terri-
torial limits of the precinct from which the complaint 
issued. 
Further, having involved the jurisdiction of the Dis-
trict Court by his own application, plaintiff now at-
tempts to divest the court of jurisdiction by Writ of 
Prohibition. No error of record has been committed by 
the District Court. Plaintiff has not exhausted his rem-
edy at law. Therefore the Peremptory Writ of Prohibi-
tion, issued by this honorable court, should in all justice 
be set aside and the writ cancelled ab initio. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
ANDREW JOHN BRENNAN, 
Assistant Attorney General 
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